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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JURIES: GENDER-BASED
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES VIOLATE THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION'S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL
PROTECTION GUARANTEE
City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739 (N.D. 1993)
I. THE CASE
On December 5, 1991, Scott Fern was arrested and charged with
driving under the influence of alcohol.1 He was tried in the county court
of Morton County.2 Fifteen men and six women were on Fern's jury
panel.3 Seven men and five women were called to the jury box for voir
dire.4 The prosecution used peremptory challenges to strike three men
from the jury panel in the course of selecting a six-person jury.5 Fern
objected to the prosecution's peremptory challenges, 6 and argued that
Batson v. Kentucky7 barred the use of gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges." While Fern did not demand a ruling on his objection to the pros-
ecution's peremptory challenges, immediately after the conference in
which the issue was discussed, the judge announced that "we have picked
our jury for today."9 A jury of four women and two men convicted
Fern. 10
Fern asserted on appeal that his equal protection rights under Bat-
son were violated by the prosecution's use of gender-based peremptory
challenges." Thus, the issue 'presented to the North Dakota Supreme
1. City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.WV.2d 739, 742 (N.D. 1993).
2. Id. at 739.
3. Id. at 742.
4. Id.
5. Id. Fern used peremptory challenges to remove two men and one woman from the jury
panel. Id. Even though both Fern and the prosecution were given four peremptory challenges, each
side chose to use only three. Id.
6. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 742.
7. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). •
8. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 742 n.I. In a conference at the bench, Fern's attorney argued that the
prosecution's strikes of three males from the jury panel were based solely on gender. IAt. The
prosecutor denied this charge but also argued that he was entitled to strike whomever he desired,
regardless of the reason. Id. In his brief to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Fern indicated that
state's attorneys in North Dakota and around the country systematically exclude males from juries in
DUI cases because DUI defendants are "overwhelmingly male." Brief for Appellant at 8, City of
Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739 (N.D. 1993). Fern provided statistics indicating that, in 1992, the
City of Mandan exercised 78% of its peremptory strikes in DUI cases against males. Addendum to
Reply Brief for Appellant at 8, City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739 (N.D. 1993). The State of
North Dakota, in 1992, exercised 71% of its peremptory challenges in DUI cases against males Id.
There are other reasons why a prosecutor may favor an all female jury Melvin Belli has suggested
that female jurors in criminal cases are more likely than male jurors to quicldy convict a defendant
and render a maximum sentence. MELVIN M. BELLI, Sn., 3 MODERN TRIALS 51.68 at 447 (2d ed.
1982).
9. Fern, 501 N.W.2d. at 742 n.1.
10. Id at 742.
11. Id.
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Court was whether Batson's principles' 2 should be extended to gender
discrimination in jury selection.' 3  In considering Fern's argument, the
court observed that the United States Supreme Court had not yet ruled
on whether Batson's principles should extend to gender discrimination.'
4
The court also recognized a split among jurisdictions on the issue.' The
court ultimately held, however, that Batson should be extended to gender
discrimination' 6 and remanded the case to the trial court for factual find-
ings consistent with the holding.'
7
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court first applied the Equal Protection
Clause' 8 to a question involving the composition of juries in Strauder v.
West Virginia." The Supreme Court held that laws prohibiting African-
Americans from serving on juries denied equal protection to African-
American defendants.20 At the same time, however, the Supreme Court
indicated that it would be constitutionally permissible for a state to pro-
hibit women from serving on juries.2 '
North Dakota was once among the states which prohibited women
from serving on juries. North Dakota's 1889 Constitution effectively
12. The Supreme Court in Batson found that a defendant has a right to be tried by a jury whose
members are selected in a nondiscriminatory manner. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86
(1986). The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that
the State will not exclude members of his race as a group from the jury venire on account of race...
or on the false assumption that members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors
." Id. (citations omitted).
13. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 744.
14. Id. at 743. The Court has now ruled on this issue. See infra notes 114-117 and
accompanying text (discussing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. T.B., 114 S. CL 1419 (1994)).
15. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 744.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 749.
18. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that "[nio state shall... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
19. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
.20. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. at 309. In Strauder, an African-American defendant
convicted in West Virginia claimed violation of his constitutional rights because state law forbade
African-Americans from serving on juries. Id. at 304. The Court agreed, indicating that
disqualification from jury service based on race "amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the
laws[.]" IL at 310. The Court based this conclusion on its understanding that the Fourteenth
Amendment created a positive right for African-Americans: "[T]he right to exemption from
unfriendly legislation against them distinctl as colored[." I. at 307-08. It found the West Virginia
statute at issue to be such "unfriendly legislation" because it placed a brand of inferiority on African-
Americans by singling them out for discriminatory treatment based on race. Id. at 308. The Batson
Court observed that Strauder -laid the foundation for the court's unceasing efforts to eradicate racial
discrimination" in jury selection. Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
21. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310. The Court indicated that the aim of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to "strike down all possible legal discriminations" against African-Americans. Id. Thus, the Court
indicated that states could not disqualify jurors basedson race, but could disqualify them based on
gender, citizenship or education. d.
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made women ineligible for jury service-' In 1921, however, the state
Legislature opened jury service to women.23 Many other states also
granted women the right to serve on juries after women won the right to
vote in 1920.4 In an exercise of its supervisory power over federal courts,
the United States Supreme Court bolstered the movement to open jury
service to women in Ballard v. United States.25 In Ballard, the Court
concluded that federal courts could not intentionally and systematically
exclude women from jury service in a state in which women were eligible
for jury service.2 6 As recently as 1962, however, three states barred
women from jury service while others prevented women from serving on
juries through automatic exemptions.2" In 1975, in Taylor v. LouisianaY2
the Supreme Court finally ruled that women could neither be excluded
from juries nor given automatic exemptions based on sex.29 Meanwhile,
the Court also extended Equal Protection Clause protections to women30
and established a standard of intermediate scrutiny under which alleged
gender-based classifications were to be reviewed.3"
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether discrimina-
tory peremptory challenges violate equal protection in Swain v. Ala-
bama.32 The Swain Court observed that peremptory challenges are
22. N.D. CoNsT. art. I, § 13 (amending N.D. CONST. art. I, § 7, which provided that -[t]he right
of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate; but a juiy in civil cases, in courts not of
record may consist of less than twelve men, as may be prescribed by law.").
23. See 1921 N.D. LAws ch. 81 (providing that -[a]i c tizens residing in any of the counties of
this state having the qualifications of electors, and of sound mind and discretion" might be eligible to
serve as jurors). The North Dakota Supreme Court held in 1934 that the legislature's statutory
permission for women to serve on juries aid not violate the state's constitution. State v. Norton, 255
N.W. 787, 793. Language suggesting that women were ineligible for jury duty in North Dakota was
removed from the state constitution in 1975. 1974 N.D. LAws ch. 603.
24. Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 105 HARV. L.
REv. 1920, 1924 (1992) [hereinafter Beyond Batson].
25. 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946).
26. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 192-93 (1946).
27. Beyond Batson, supra note 24, at 1924. See also Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61 (1961)
(holding that a state law which gave women an absolute exemption from jury service was
constitutional).
28. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
29. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975). This holding was based on the Sixth
Amendment principle that juries be drawn from a fair cross section of the community. Id.
30. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971) (holding that a law which gave arbitrary preference
to males was unconstitutional because it denied equal protection to females).
31. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973). The Frontiero plurality found that
classifications based on gender were suspect and therefore subject to "close judicial scrutiny." Id. In
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), a majority of the Court indicated that gender-based
classifications "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives". This standard of scrutiny has been refined in the Court's most
recent gender discrimination decisions. In Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984), the Supreme
Court used language from Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) in
applying intermediate scrutiny. Heckler, 465 U.S. at 744. The Hogan Court analyzed the question of
intermediate scrutiny at length. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724-25. The Court observed that the party
seeking to uphold a gender-based classification must provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification"
for the classification. Id. The Court stressed that, in gender bias cases, intermediate scrutiny "must
be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females." Id
32. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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"challenges without cause, without explanation and without judicial scru-
tiny."33 The Court stated that a prosecutor's consistent use of peremptory
challenges to remove African-Americans from jury panels.in "case after
case" would be a perversion of the peremptory challenge system and
would implicate the Fourteenth Amendment.3 The Court indicated,
however, that a defendant who wished to raise this constitutional issue
would have to show that a given prosecutor made "systematic" peremp-
tory challenges against African-Americans "over a period of time."-"
Swain thus imposed a "crippling burden of proof" on defendants wishing
to prove discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. 6
The Court in Batson v. Kentucky rejected the evidentiary burden
established by Swain,37 and held that racial discrimination in the selection
of a venire violates the Equal Protection Clause. 3 It also established a
new procedure for proving a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination
in the selection of a jury.39 The Batson decision applied specifically to
cases involving African-American defendants in which the prosecutor had
peremptorily struck African-American venire persons from the jury.40
The Supreme Court, however, has since extended Batson,4' most recently
33. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965). The Swain Court traced the history of
peremptory challenges from fourteenth century England to the twentieth century. Id. at 212-17.
The Court stated that peremptories have long been regarded as "a necessary part of trial by jury." Id.
at 219. The Court further indicated that -[t]he function of the challenge is not only to eliminate
extremes or partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the
case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise." Id.
34. ld at 223-24.
35. Id. at 227. The Swain Court found no systematic discrimination through the use of
peremptory challenges in the case before it even though the defendant showed that "no Negro within
the memory of persons now living has ever served on any petit jury in any civil or criminal case tried
in Talladega County, Alabama." Swain, 380 U.S. 231-32 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
36. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986). The Batson Court indicated that lower courts
which had interpreted Swain understood that case to have held that "repeated striking of blacks over
a number of cases was necessary to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." l&
(footnote omitted), The Batson Court observed that this interpretation of Swain had made
peremptory challenges by prosecutors "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny." IL. at 92-93.
37. Id. at 93.
38. Id. at 86. The Supreme Court stated that a prosecutor ordinarily may exercise peremptory
challenges for any reason at all, but the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor from striking
potential jurors based solely on race or on an assumption that African-American jurors will not be
impartial. Id. at 89.
39. Id at 96-97. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant must first show
that he or she is a member of a given racial group and that the prosecutor has struck members of that
group. IdL at 96. The defendant may rely on the fact that peremptory challenges give those who want
to discriminate a chance to do so. Id The defendant ultimately must show that the facts presented
raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors based
on race. Id.
40. Id. at 89.
41. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 477 (1989) (indicating that a defendant who was not
African-American had standing to challenge the exclusion of African-Americans from the jury because
the Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury that represents a fair cross section of the
community); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (stating that defendants, regardless of race,
may raise third-party Equal Protection Clause claims for jurors who are excluded based on race by
prosecutors exercising peremptory challenges); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S.
614, 630 (1991) (indicating that a civil litigant may raise an Equal Protection Clause claim for a juror
660
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holding that defendants in criminal cases may not exercise race-based
peremptory challenges.'
The Supreme Court had not ruled on whether to extend Batson to
discriminatory gender-based peremptory challenges at the time of the
Fern decision. 3 Most jurisdictions which had ruled on the matter had
refused to extend Batson to gender-based peremptory strikes." In
United States v. Broussard,' the Fifth Circuit ruled that Batson should
not be extended to gender-based discrimination because race lies at the
"core of the commands" of the Fourteenth Amendment 46 and because
who is excluded based on race by an opposing party); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358
(1991) (applying Batson's principles to a case involving the exclusion of Hispanic venire persons).
42. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992). The MeCollurn Court first applied
Batson and ound that discriminatory peremptory challenges by a criminal defendant were
unconstitutional because of the harms inflicted on potential jurors and the community as a whole. Id.
at 2353-54. The Court next applied Edmonson, 500 U.S. 614, and found that peremptory challenges
by a criminal defendant constituted state action because they were performed within the atmosphere
of the courtroom and with the support of the state. lUL at 2355-56. The Court last applied Powers,
499 U.S. at 400, and found that the government had standing to raise a claim of discrimination against
a criminal defendant in order to protect the rights of parties who may have been harmed by such
discrimination. Il at 2357. Four members of the Court (two concurring and two dissenting)
questioned the majority's reliance on Edmonson and its conclusion that peremptory challenges made
by a criminal defendant were state action. Justice O'Connor dissented, arguing at length that the
actions of parties other than the state should not be considered state action. Id. at 2361-64
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also dissented, agreeing with Justice O'Connor. Id. at 2364-
65 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred but expressed his continuing
disagreement with the Edmonson holding "on the issue of 'state action' under the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 2359 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Justice Thomas agreed with the Chief
Justice on the state action issue, and added his own view opposing the Court's "continuing attempts to
use the Constitution to regulate peremptory challenges." Id. at 2359 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
43. The Court ruled on April 19, 1994, that gender-based peremptory challenges violate the
Equal Protection Clause. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994). See infra notes
114-117 and accompanying text (discussingJ.E.B.).
44. See UniteStates v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (4th Cir. 1988) (refusing to extend
Batson because racial discrimination was the evil that Batson was aimed at preventing); United States
v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257, 1262 (7th Cir. 1991) (indicating that the Batson inquiry must be limited to
racial discrimination); Daniels v. State, 581 So. 2d 536, 538-39 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (observing that
Batson "offers no authority for the extension of the principles contained therein beyond racial
discrimination"); State v. Adams, 533 So. 2d 1060, 1063 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (indicating that, under
Batson, race is the only unreasonable classification for striking jurors); State v. Pullen, 811 S.W.2d
463, 467 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that Batson only applies to racial discrimination); State v.
Culver, 444 NAV.2d 662, 666 (Neb. 1989) (indicating that Batson should be applied only to race-
based peremptory challenges); State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867, 870 (R.I. 1987) (observing that Batson
does not apply to gender-based discrimination). See also Cleveland v. State, 865 S.W.2d 285 (Ark.
1993) (indicating that it would be "unsound" to extend Batson to gender); Potts v. State, 376 S.E.2d
851,856 (Ga. 1989) (refusing to allow a male to raise a discrimination claim under Batson because he
lacked standing to question the striking of female venirepersons); People v. Crowder, 515 N.E.2d
783, 786 (Il1. App. Ct. 1987) (indicating that a male defendant does not have standing to challenge
exclusion of female venirepersons under Batson); Hannan v. Commonwealth, 774 S.W.2d 462, 464
(Cy. Ct. App. 1989) (stating, in dicta, that Batson provides no authority for application beyond racial
diicrimination).
45. 987 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1993).
46. United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 1993). In Strauder v. West Virginia,
the Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment was "designed to assure to the colored race the
enjoyment of all the civil rights that under that law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that
race the protection of the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by
the States." 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880). The Batson Court focused on the harms created by racial
discrimination in justifying its decision, stating that "[e]xclusion of black citizens from service as jurors
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"gender discrimination and racial discrimination are different in relevant
ways."47 Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Broussard court found that
the government's interest in fair juries would be "frustrated by extending
Batson to gender because it would require, on demand of counsel, an
explanation for every strike."4
On the other hand, in United States v. De Gross,49 the Ninth Circuit
found equal protection principles to prohibit striking venire persons on
the basis of gender and held that Batson should therefore be extended to
such strikes.50 In applying intermediate scrutiny, the De Gross court
found that gender-based challenges are not substantially related to "the
important governmental objective of impaneling a fair and impartial jury"
because they are based on a reason other than the "sudden impression" of
a potential juror's ability to be impartial.-' Only a few jurisdictions that
had ruled on the issue prior to the Fern decision had agreed with the De
Gross court and held that Batson should be extended.52 Other jurisdic-
tions had held that peremptory challenges based on gender should be
forbidden because they violate state constitutions, while some jurisdic-
tions interpreted state constitutional provisions requiring that juries rep-
resent a fair cross section of the community to prohibit gender-based
discrimination in jury selection.-4
constitutes a primary example of the evil the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to cure." 476
U.S. at 85.
47. Broussard, 987 F.2d at 219-20. According to the Broussard court, one significant difference
between gender and race is that classifications based on gender are subject only to intermediate
scrutiny. Id. at 218. This is because gender is a protected class, not a suspect class. Id. One reason
for strict scrutiny of race-based classifications, according to the Broussard court, is to protect groups
that are numerical minorities, which women are not. Id. at 220.
48. Id. at 219.
49. 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
50. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
51. Id at 1439. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Batson, argued that "unadulterated equal
protection analysis" should not be applied generally to peremptoy challenges because such
challenges must be based on -only limited information or hunch." 476 U.S. at 123 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). The De Gross court found gender-based peremptory strikes to be invalid because such
challenges are based not on hunches about "a particular venireperson" but on assumptions about
"members of a certain group[.]" 960 F.2d at 1439.
52. See People v. Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (memorandum decision)
(holding that Batson principles should be extended to gender-based peremptory challenges); State v.
Burch, 830 P.2d 357, 364 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that gender-based peremptory challenges
violate the Equal Protection Clause).
53. See State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849-50 (Haw. 1990) (holding that gender-based
peremptory challenges violate both the state's equal protection clause and the findamnental rights of
citizenship as guaranteed by the state constitution); State v. Gonzales, 808 P.2d 40, 48-49 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that gender-based peremptory challenges violate the state constitutional
requirement that juries represent a fair cross section of community and the constitutional provision
that prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender); Tyler v. State, 623 A.2d 648, 650-51 (Md. 1993)
(finding that the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of gender violated the
Maryland Equal Rights Amendment).
54. See People v. Wheeler, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 903 (Cal. 1978) (indicating that peremptory
challenges based on group bias violate the state constitution); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d
499, 516 (Mass. 1979) (observing that gender is one generic group affiation which, under the state
constitution, may not permissibly be used as a basis for juror exclusion); State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d
662
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION
The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the question of gender
bias in jury selection for the first time in City of Mandan v. Fern.55 In an
opinion written by Justice Levine, the court opened its analysis of the
defendant's discrimination claims with an examination of Batson. The
court stated that Batson prohibits peremptory strikes by prosecutors
based on race because racial discrimination during jury selection harms
excluded jurors, undermines public confidence in the judicial system, and
stimulates community prejudice.5" The court indicated that it found
Fern's argument for extension of Batson to gender to be persuasive.58
The court observed that seven jurisdictions had held that Batson's
principles should be extended to gender 9 and that three other jurisdic-
tions had found gender discrimination in peremptory challenges unlawful
on other grounds.60 The court indicated that it found the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in De Gross to be persuasive.61 The De Gross court found that
gender discrimination is similar to racial discrimination because it stimu-
lates community prejudice, impeding equal justice for women. 62 It indi-
cated that gender-based peremptories are similar to race-based
peremptories because they are not based upon the qualifications of the
potential juror. 3 The De Gross court also found that gender-based
strikes can reduce public confidence in the justice system. 64 It concluded
that because gender-based peremptory strikes are founded on the "false
assumption"65 that members of certain groups are either unqualified to
1150, 1159 (N.J. 1986) (stating that peremptory challenges based on bias founded on the potential
juror's membership in a cognizable group violate the state constitution).
55. 501 N.W.2d 739 (N.D. 1993).
56. City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739, 743 (N.D. 1993).
57. Id (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 87). The court also indicated that Batson allows a defendant
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination using only the facts of her case. Id (citing Batson,
476 U.S. at 96. Once a prima facie case is made, the state must provide a neutral explanation for the
allegedly race-based challenges. Batson, 476 U.S at 97.
58. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 744. In holding that Batson should be extended to gender, the court
recognized that the United States Supreme Court was preparing to consider the issue. Id at 743 n.2.
The Court has now decided this issue. See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text (discussing
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994)). The North Dakota Supreme Court further
Indicated that it would not consider the issue of gender discrimination in jury selection under the
state constitution because it found that Fern failed to properly raise a state constitutional claim. IU at
744 n.3. See infra note 137 (discussing the inadequacy of Fern's state constitutional argument).
59. a at 744. See supra notes 52-53 (listing decisions barring gender-based peremptory
challenges based on federal or state Equal Protection Clause grounds).
60. Fern, 501 N.V.2d at 744 n.4. See supra note 54 (listing decisions barring gender-based
peremptory challenges on other than federal or state Equal Protection Clause grounds).
61. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 744.
62. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1992).
63. Id at 1439.
64. Id The De Gross court indicated that "full community participation" in the justice system is
an important factor contributing to public confidence in the system. Id If potential jurors are
excluded based on race or gender, "ful communit participation" becomes difficult to achieve. Id
65. Id. The De Gross court explained that "[if the decision to exclude a juror is based solely on
the sex of the juror, the decision to exclude must necessarily be based on ... false assumptions[.]" Id
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serve as jurors or unable to consider a case impartially, such strikes are
not substantially related to the important governmental objective of
achieving a fair and impartial jury and are therefore prohibited by the
Equal Protection Clause.66 The Fern court indicated that it found this
reasoning to be "enlightened and enlightening." 6
The court then began its own consideration of whether Batson
should be extended to gender, and indicated that intermediate scrutiny is
the appropriate standard of review for cases of alleged gender discrimina-
tion.6 Under this standard, established by the United States Supreme
Court in Craig v. Boren,6 9 "[gender] discrimination is not unconstitutional
if it is substantially related to the achievement of important governmental
objectives." 70 The North Dakota Supreme Court observed that peremp-
tory challenges help in achieving an important governmental objective,
the formation of fair juries.7 ' Following the logic of the De Gross court,
however, the court found that gender-based peremptories do not aid in
achieving this end because such peremptories are based on false assump-
tions as to the qualifications or impartiality of the challenged jurors.7'
The court concluded that gender-based peremptories are not substantially
related to an important governmental objective and are thus
unconstitutional.7"
The court reasoned that the United States Supreme Court in Batson
abandoned Swain74 as a reaction to the continued presence of racial dis-
crimination in courtrooms despite more than a century of judicial work
aimed at eliminating it.75 On the other hand, the court stated, gender
bias in courtrooms had only recently been recognized as a problem, 6
even though it "has longstanding cultural and historic roots."77 The court
66Id.
67. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 744.
68. Id
69. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
70. Craig v. Boren, 42) U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
71. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 744 (citing United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1439).
72. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 744-45.
73. Id. at 745. The court indicated, however, that while gender-based peremptories are
constitutionally impermissible, peremptories based on other grounds, like a juror's occupation, would
generally be constitutional because such peremptories serve the important government objective of
selecting fair and impartial juries. Id.
74. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1964). The Supreme Court in Batson rejected the
evidentiary burden that Swain imposed on a defendant's attempt to prove racial discrimination in the
jury selection process. See supra note 36 (discussing the requirements of Swain as understood by the
Batson Court).
75. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 745. The Supreme Court in Powers observed that the Court has
recognized racial discrimination in jury selection as unconstitutional since 1880, but "[diespite the
clarity of . . . [the Court's] commands to eliminate the taint of racial discrimination in the
administration ofjustice, allegations of bias in the jury selection process persist." Powers v. Ohio. 111
S.Ct. 1364, 1366 (1991).
76. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 745.
77. Id. at 746.
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indicated that attorney reliance on jury selection manuals which pro-
pound gender stereotypes was evidence of the continuing problem of
gender bias in the courtroom. 8 The court concluded that gender-based
peremptories were a product of a long history of gender discrimination,79
and, consequently, that there was ample justification to extend Batson to
gender discrimination. 80
The court thus rejected the rationale of the Broussard court, which
held that the use of gender-based peremptories did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause."' The Broussard court's holding rested upon its con-
clusion that classifications based on race and gender differ in significant
ways and should therefore be evaluated differently.8 2 While granting that
the standards for judging racial and gender discrimination are different,
the Fern court criticized the Broussard court's application of these stan-
dards.' The Broussard court's argument, as interpreted by the Fern
court, was that gender discrimination in jury selection is acceptable
because it cannot succeed in preventing all members of a given gender
from serving on a jury. 4 The Fern court criticized this rationale as con-
doning discrimination because it "overlooks entirely the excluded
venireperson's right to equal protection."' While the court admitted that
fair juries might be produced by the process endorsed by the Broussard
court, it reasoned that "[w]hen the process is riddled with unfair,
unseemly and unacceptable gender discrimination, it is of small moment
that the process did not entirely contaminate the product."86 The court
further indicated that allowing discriminatory exclusion of jurors contami-
78. Id (citing Beyond Batson, supra note 24, at 1920). Melvin Belli's treatise on trial practice
contains sections examining considerations attorneys should take into account when choosing
between male or female jurors. BELLi, supra note 8, at % 51.67, .68. Belli states that "a male juror is
generally more sound than a female juror." Id. § 51.67. Belli also advises that females are more
opinionated than men and reach decisions more quickly. Id. § 51.68.
79. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 746.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 747.
82. United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215,219 (5th Cir. 1993). See supra text accompanying
notes 46-47 (discussing the differences between gender and racial classifications).
83. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 747.
84. Id. at 747-48. The Broussard court found that women, because they are not a minority, do
not face the same barriers to jury participation faced by racial minorities. 987 F.2d at 220. The court
further observed that peremptory strikes based solely on gender are generally not effective in
removing all members of a given gender from a jury. Id The court thus found gender discrimination
in jury selection to be "chilled by the numbersf.1" Id. The court did not find gender discrimination to
be less harmful than racial discrimination, but instead indicated that Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965). provided an adequate framework for evaluating gender discrimination. Broussard, 987 F.2d
at 220. Thus, the court ound no reason to extend Batson. Id.
85. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 748. The court criticized the Broussard court for "questioning.. .
[women's] need for protection because of their numerical superiority." Id. The court further noted
the Supreme Court's refusal to accept an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that varies the
level of scrutiny "'according to tie ability of different groups to defend their interests in the
representative process.'" Id at 748 n.9 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
495 (1989)).
86. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 748.
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nates public confidence in the judicial system because it makes discrimi-
nation an integral part of the system.87 The court concluded that
"[i]nstitutionalizing gender bias is something we should not do until the
Supreme Court of the United States clearly directs us to." 8
Having established the unconstitutionality of gender-based per-
emptories, the court next turned to an analysis of how a case of alleged
gender discrimination in jury selection should be handled.89 The court
indicated that a trial court faced with a gender discrimination question
must first determine whether the defendant has presented a prima facie
case of discrimination, and then must allow the prosecutor an opportunity
to provide a gender-neutral explanation for the allegedly discriminatory
actions.90 The court observed- that Fern's trial court did not follow this
procedure. 91 The court therefore set out instructions for an evaluation of
Fern's claim upon remand.
92
The court first examined how a defendant may establish a prima
facie case of discrimination under Batson. 3 Under Batson, a party seek-
ing to establish a prima facie case of discrimination must first show that a
peremptory challenge was exercised against a member of a "constitution-
ally cognizable" group and then must demonstrate that the challenge was
based on that group membership. 4 The Batson Court further indicated
that the trial court must consider all relevant circumstances in deciding
whether a challenge is discriminatory.9 The Fern court endorsed this





91. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 748.
92. Id. at 748-50. Justice Levine relied heavily on Batson in exploring how a gender
discrimination claim should be evaluated. Id Her view that Batson provides the proper framework
for this process was fully shared only by Justice Meschke. Id at 750. Chief Justice VandeWalle, in a
special concurrence joined by Justices Neumann and Sandstrom, suggested that the Batson process
should not be applied to cases of alleged gender discrimination. See infra notes 105-12 and
accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice VandeWalle's concurrence).
93. Fern, 501 N.V.2d at 748.
94. Id Batson specifically allowed a defendant to make a prima facie case of discrimination by
demonstrating membership in a cognizable racial group and then showing that peremptory challenges
were exercised to remove potential-jurors of the same racial group. 476 U.S. at 96. Batson has since
been extended to embrace other situations. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing
the extension of Batson to situations in which jurors and defendants are not members of the same
racial group, to defendants and plaintiffs in civil cases, and to the state in criminal cases).
95. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97. The Batson Court stated that the existence of a pattern of strikes
against African-American jurors during the selection of a jury might support an "inference of
discrimination." Id at 97. At the same time, the prosecutor's statements and questions during voir
dire "may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose." Id. The Batson Court indicated
that it was confident that experienced trial judges wouFd be able to examine the circumstances




that "the use of a single peremptory challenge against a man or a woman"
might establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination.96
The court therefore indicated that a trial court should look at a vari-
ety of factors when evaluating a gender discrimination claim.97 These fac-
tors include: the composition of the jury panel in comparison to the
composition of the jury finally selected, the number of challenges exer-
cised against a particular group, the conduct of the prosecutor while
examining jurors, and the existence of a pattern of exclusion of members
of a particular group in similar cases.98 If a reasonable observer could
conclude that the circumstances demonstrate a "fairly obvious" discrimi-
natory intent, a prima facie case is established. 99
If a prima facie case of discrimination is established, the burden
shifts to the prosecutor to give a neutral explanation for the suspicious
challenges. 100 The juror's specific responses and demeanor during voir
dire may be used as a basis for this neutral explanation, 10 1 but intent to
exclude on the basis of group membership is not a neutral reason for
exclusion. 0 2 The court concluded that trial judges were in the best posi-
tion to make judgments on gender-bias claims in jury selection.103
Because such judgments will hinge on credibility, the court indicated that
a judgment on a gender-bias claim would not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous. 1
04
Chief Justice VandeWalle stated in a special concurrence that, while
gender discrimination should not be condoned, it may not be appropriate
to use Batson's factors to raise an inference of gender discrimination.10 5
Justices Neumann and Sandstrom joined this concurrence, and thus the
majority of the court shared the Chief Justice's doubts about the applica-
bility of the Batson test to gender.'" Chief Justice VandeWalle indicated
that while every potential juror who is struck from a jury panel will be
either a man or a woman, it is not likewise true that every struck juror will
be a member of a different race. 107 Thus, the Chief Justice reasoned, it
may not be appropriate to apply a method designed to allow the inference
of racial discrimination-the Batson test-to instances of alleged gender




100. L (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98).
101. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 749 (citing State v. Burch. 830 P.2d 357, 364 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
102. Id (citing Hernandez v. New York, 300 U.S. 352, 361-62 (1991)).
103. d (citing People v. Wheeler, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 906 (Cal. 1978)).
104. Id (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, and Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369).
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discrimination.108 It would be more appropriate, the Chief Justice sug-
gested, to apply a procedure like the one set forth in Swain v. Alabama.
109
Under a Swain procedure, the defense would be required to show that, in
case after case, the prosecution had excluded jurors of a given gender."'
The prosecution would then be required to give a gender-neutral explana-
tion for the allegedly gender-based challenges made in the particular
case."' Concluding, the Chief Justice stated that he was "not convinced"
that Batson provided the only fair framework for determining whether
discriminatory peremptory strikes had been made, but he admitted that
he did not know what the appropriate method for making such a determi-
nation should be.
112
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
The ultimate holding of Fern was that gender-based peremptory
challenges are unconstitutional. 113  The United States Supreme Court
effectively endorsed this holding when it reached a similar conclusion in
J.E.B. P. Alabama ex rel. T.B. n4 The J.E.B. Court found gender discrimi-
108. Id.
109. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The Chief Justice's opinion seems to reflect the reasoning of the
Broussard court which observed that "[wle are Persuaed that Swain is a sound accommodation of
the interests of fair trial and interests in selection free of gender bias." 987 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir.
1993). Broussard was criticized at length by Justice Levine in her opinion for the court. See supra
notes 81-88 and accompanying text (discussing the Fern court's reaction to the Broussard court's
conclusion that Batson s ould not be extended to gender-based peremptory challenges).
110. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36 (discussing Swain).
During the 21 years that Swain was law, the required showing of systematic discrimination was made
in only two recorded cases. Beyond Batson, supra note 24, at 1923 n. 29. See State v. Brown, 371 So.
2d 751, 754 (La. 1979) (finding that the defendant made a prima facie case of discrimination by
demonstrating that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges showed a "continual and conscious
rejection of blacks"); State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162, 1164-65 (La. 1979) (finding that the
defendant made a prima facie case of discrimination when "objective evidence of systematic exclusion
of blacks" through peremptory challenges was combined with the prosecutor's admissions that he
excluded African-American jurors "soley on the basis of race").
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 744.
114. 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994). The case involved a paternity and child support claim. J.E.B.
v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994). The state struck nine male jurors from thepanel
through the use of peremptory challenges, and an all-female jury found the petitioner to be the father
and ordered payment oachild support. Ia The petitioner objected to the state's pere
challenges, alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. d The trial court reject ed
petitioner's claim. Id. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court, and indicated
that it was bound to follow Alabama precedent on the issue. J.E.B. v. State ex rel. T.B., 606 So. 2d
156, 157 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992). Daniels v. State, 581 So. 2d 536 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), was among
the cases used by the Court of Civil Appeals as precedent. J.E.B., 606 So. 2d at 157. Danlels was the
first case in which an Alabama court discussed the issue of extending Batson to gender-based
peremptory strikes. Daniels, 581 So. 2d at 538. In Daniels, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
relied on United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), in holding that Batson shoulT not
be extended beyond racial discrimination. Daniels, 581 So. 2d at 539. The Hamilton court, in
analyzing Batson, observed that -there is no evidence to suggest that the Supreme Court would apply
normal equal protection principles to the unique situation involving peremptory challenges."
Hamilton, 850 F.2d at 1042. The Hamilton court therefore did not apply intermediate scrutiny to the
question and instead relied on its analysis of the Supreme Court's intent to conclude that "the Court
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nation in jury selection to be similar to racial discrimination because both
racial minorities and women "share a history of total exclusion" from jury
service."' 3 The Court further found that gender discrimination in jury
selection, like racial discrimination, harms "the litigants, the community,
and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded[.]" 11  Based on the
similarities between gender and racial discrimination in jury selection,
and the similar harms created by such discrimination, the Court con-
cluded that it was appropriate to extend the protections of Batson to those
claiming gender discrimination in jury selection.117  Because the J.E.B.
Court embraced a rationale similar to that of the Fern court in finding
gender-based peremptory challenges unconstitutional, it will be useful to
refer to the J.E.B. opinion in analyzing the implications of Fern.
Several questions were left unanswered by the North Dakota court
in Fern. Perhaps the most significant of these was the question of what
standard a court should apply in evaluating gender discrimination claims.
Justice Levine, writing for the court, provided clear guidelines as to how a
court should deal with a claim of gender discrimination in jury selec-
tion."'8 The procedure she suggested was derived directly from Bat-
son." 9 Under this standard, a party may establish a discrimination claim
based solely on the facts of her own case. 12 0 Justice Levine, however, was
joined in her endorsement of this standard by only Justice Meschke.12 1
The Chief Justice, in a special concurrence joined by Justices Neumann
and Sandstrom, raised doubts about the application of the Batson stan-
dard to gender discrimination claims.'2. He observed that every peremp-
tory strike must involve a woman or a man, and that if Batson's standards
were applied, every strike conceivably could provide a basis for a discrimi-
nation claim.'23 Chief Justice VandeWalle, however, did not provide a
intended Batson to apply to prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of race only.-
Il at 1042-43. The United States Supreme Court, confronting the issue of gender discrimination in
the exercise of peremptory challenges for the first time, reversed the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
and found gender-based peremptory challenges to be unconstitutional. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1430.
115. Id. at 101. The Court further indicated that it was unneccessary to analyze whether women
or minorities had suffered more from discrimination. ld. Instead, the court simply "acknowledge(d]
that 'our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.'" Id. (quoting
Frontero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)).
116. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1427.
117. Ld. at 1429-30. The Court observed that '[equal opportunity to participate in the fair
administration of justice is fundamental to our democratic system.' Id. at 1430. Thus, discrimination
based on race or gender jeopardizes "the integrity of our judicial system[.]" Id.
118. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 749. See supra note 92 (discussing Justice Levine's instructions on
how a gender discrimination in jury selection claim should be addressed).
119. Id at 748-49 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986)).
120. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
121. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 750.
122. Id. at 750 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring specially). See supra notes 105-112 and
accompanying text (discussing the problems of applying Batson to situations not involving racial
groups).
123. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 750 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring specially). The Chief Justice
suggested that the Swain standard might be more appropriate to use in evaluating cases of alleged
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definite alternative to the Batson test in his special concurrence. 24 For-
tunately, the United States Supreme Court seems to have resolved the
issue addressed by the Fern Court's split opinions: in J.E.B., the Court
indicated that the Batson standard should be applied to claims of gender
discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges.'
25
Another question left unanswered by the Fern Court was whether
the prosecution in a criminal case may challenge allegedly discriminatory
strikes made by the defense. In Georgia v. McCollum'26 , the Supreme
Court held that Batson extended to race-based peremptory challenges
made by criminal defendants.' 27 The De Gross court,128 in a decision
relied on extensively by Justice Levine, held discriminatory gender-based
peremptory challenges by either the prosecution or defense in a criminal
case to be unconstitutional. 12 9 The J.E.B. Court, while not ruling specifi-
cally on the issue, seemed to endorse the reasoning of McCollum.'3 0 If
the North Dakota Supreme Court follows the reasoning of McCollum, De
Gross, and J.E.B. in future cases, it is likely to extend Fern's ban on dis-
criminatory peremptory challenges to those made by criminal defendants.
A final question left unanswered by the Fern court was whether gen-
der discrimination in jury selection should be barred in civil cases. The
J.E.B. Court addressed gender-based peremptory challenges made in a
civil context and found such challenges to be unconstitutional.'13 J.E.B.,
gender discrimination. Id. See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text (discussing application of
e Swain standard). The Broussard court also suggested that the Swain standard might be
appropiate to gender discrimination cases, but did-not agree that gender-based peremptory
chAllenges violate the Equal Protection Clause. United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 220 (5th
Cir. 1993). See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Broussard court's
application of the constitution to gender-based peremptory strikes).
124. See supra notes 105-112 and accompanying text (discussing the alternatives to the Batson
approach suggested by the Chief Justice in his special concurrence).
125. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1429-30 (1994). In finding that the Batson
standard should be applied, the Court was careful to make clear that peremptory challenges may still
be used to remove potential jurors, regardless of gender. Id. at 1429. "Gender simply may not serve
as a proxy for bias" when peremptory challenges are exercised. Id. The Court stated that strikes
based on characteristics overwhelmingly associated with a given gender could be found to be
legitimate under this standard. Id. For example, it may be allowable or a party to strike all nurses or
allpersons with military experience from a jury panel. Id. at n.16. When such a strike is challenged.
and the party opposing the strike makes a prima facie showing of discrimination as required by
Batson, the party maing the strike is required "merely" to provide an explanation "based on a juror
characteristic other than gender[.]" J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1430. The Court indicated that such an
explanation may be acceptable "absent a showing of pretext." Id. at 1429.
126. 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992).
127. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348,2354 (1992). See supra note 42 and accompanying
text (discussing the Supreme Court's extension of Batson to peremptory challenges made by criminal
defendants).
128. United States v. De Cross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1439-42 (9th Cir. 1992).
129. ld. at 1439-42. See also City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739, 744 (N.D. 1993).
130. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1427 (1994). The Court indicated that cases
like McCollum established "that individual jurors themselves have a right to nondiscriminatory
selection procedures." Id. The Court stated that "this right extends to both men and women." Id. at
1428.
131. Id. at 1429.
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however, was not a typical civil case: the state itself filed the paternity
action and exercised the discriminatory challenges.' Justice O'Connor,
who had previously objected to the extension of Batson to private liti-
gants,'33 joined the majority inJ.E.B., but indicated in a concurrence that
the Court's decision should be "limited to a prohibition on the govern-
ment's use of gender-based peremptory challenges."'1 4  If the North
Dakota Supreme Court follows Justice O'Connor's rationale, it may allow
civil litigants to exercise gender-based peremptory challenges. On the
other hand, even Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence to J.E.B., indi-
cated that she did not think it was likely that future courts would limit the
bar on gender-based peremptories to those exercised by the govern-
ment.13s Thus, private civil litigants in North Dakota may be barred from
using gender-based peremptory challenges.
If the United States Supreme Court had refused to extend Batson's
principles in J.E.B., it is likely that the North Dakota Supreme Court
would still have been able to justiIt, a ban on gender discrimination in jury
selection under the state constitution.' 38 The issue of whether gender-
based peremptory challenges are unconstitutional under the state consti-
tution was not discussed in Fern.'z7 The court, however, is permitted to
construe the state constitution to provide more protection than is pro-
vided by the federal constitution,' 3 8 and it seems to review gender dis-
crimination claims under the state's equal protection provisions at a
greater level of scrutiny than is used by the United States Supreme Court
132. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 631(1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (indicating that "a peremptory strike by a private litigant is fundamentally a matter of
private choice and not state action"); see also supra note 42 (discussing the positions of the justices
who have challenged the extension of Batson to civil cases).
134. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor argued that Batson
should not prevent private actors, be they civil litigants or criminal defendants, from exercising race
or gender based peremptory challenges. Id. She stated that such parties are not state actors. Id.
135. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J. concurring). Justice O'Connor speculated about
what the Court might do in future cases in which private parties exercisedperemptory challenges. Id.
She wondered whether the Court would bar a battered woman "on for wounding her abusive
husband" from using gender-based peremptories. Id at 1433. She concluded that the Court
probably would, even though she hoped otherwise. Id
136. The North Dakota Constitution provides that "[nlo special privileges or immunities shall
ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked or repealed by the egislative assembly; nor shall
any citizen or class of citizens be granted privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall
not be granted to all citizens." N.D. CONsT. art. I, § 21. In addition, the constitution provides that
[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation." N.D. CoNsT. art. I, § 22.
137. City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739, 744 n. 3 (N.D. 1993). Justice Levine stated that
Fern's attorney attempted to raise the state constitutional issue but that his mere citation of article 1,
sections 21 and 22, or the North Dakota Constitution was not enough to raise the issue. Id.
138. See City of Bismarck v. Altevogt, 353 N.W.2d 760 (N.D. 1984) (indicating that "we may
provide the citizens of our state, as a matter of state constitutional law, greater protection than the
safeguards guaranteed in the Federal Constitution").
1994]
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in considering claims under the federal Equal Protection Clause.139 In
previous decisions under the state constitution, the court has indicated
that it considers gender to be a suspect class. 140 Suspect classifications
are subject to "strict judicial scrutiny." 41 Under strict scrutiny, the court
will "strike down the challenged classification unless it promotes a com-
pelling government interest and the distinction drawn is necessary to fur-
ther its purpose."142 In light of the North Dakota Supreme Court's stated
opposition to gender discrimination in jury selection or elsewhere, 43 it is
reasonable to conjecture that even if the federal constitutional basis of
Fern had been removed by the J.E.B. Court, discriminatory gender-based
jury selection would not long have been tolerated in North Dakota.
Perhaps the most helpful information provided by the Fern decision
was a detailed explanation of the North Dakota court's position on gender
discrimination. The court had rarely dealt with the issue of gender dis-
crimination on a federal constitutional level and had not previously
detailed its standard of scrutiny in such cases. 1' Fern clearly sets out the
standards under which the court will review the issue.14s The court
recently ruled on two other significant cases which dealt with the issue of
gender discrimination. In Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc.' 46 the
court suggested that gender discrimination in employment might amount
139. The United States Supreme Court applies intermediate scrutiny to gender discrimination
claims. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). This was the standard applied by Justice Levine in
considering Fern's claim under the federal constitution. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 744.
140. See State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621, 627 (N.D. 1977) (indicating that
"classifications based on sex are 'inherently suspect' under our State Constitution").
141. Id.
142. Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219, 221 (N.D. 1989).
143. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 750 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring specially).
144. Tang v. Ping, 209 N.W.2d 624 (N.D. 1973), was apparently the first case in which the court
dealt with the issue ol gender discrimination under the federal Equal Protection Clause. Citing the
Supreme Court's decision in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the court indicated that
"classifications based upon sex are inherently suspect and must be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny." Tang, 209 N.W.2d at 627. It thus found that application of a state statute which defined
minors as males under age 21 and females under age 18 "would deny males ages eighteen through
twenty the equal protection of the law as prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution." Id. The court, however, apparently did not apply strict scrutiny when it made
this decision, asking instead whether the classification had a "reasonable relationship" to the law in
question. Id In Hastings v. James River Aerie No. 2337-Fraternal Order of Eagles, 246 N.W.2d
747 (N.D. 1976), the court dealt with the question of whether allowing a husband to recover for loss
of consortium under the Dram Shop Act while denying a wife the same right would be a violation of
equal protection. Id. at 751. The court found that denying a wife the right to recovery would be a
violation of equal protection under both the North Dakota and United States Constitutions. Id. The
court did not, however, indicate the basis for this conclusion. Id. Instead, it cited an Ohio case which
observed that such a classification is "unreasonable" and a Federal District Court case which observed
that there is no "rational basis- for denying a wife the right to recover for loss of consortium. I& at
751-52 (citing Leffler v. Wiley, 239 N.E.2d 235 (1968) and Karczewski v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R.
Co., 274 F. Supp. 169 (1967)).
145. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 744 (indicating that the North Dakota Supreme Court will apply
intermediate scrutiny to gender discrimination claims under the federal constitution).
146. 498 N.W.2d 174 (N.D. 1993).
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to intentional infliction of emotional distress. 147 In Schweigert v. Provi-
dent Life Ins. Co.,148 the court reviewed the framework it uses to analyze
cases involving gender discrimination. 149 Considered with these cases,
Fern can provide important insight to practitioners bringing gender dis-
crimination claims before the court.
Michael J. Hagburg
147. Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc., 493 N.W.2d 174, 182 (N.D. 1993). Swenson dealt
with a gender discrimination claim based on the state Equal Pay Act and tort law. ME at 176. The
court affirmed the lower court's decision rejecting the plaintiff's gender discrimination claim, id. at
177-78, but found material facts in dispute as to the plaintiff's Equal Pay Act claim. Id at 180. The
court likewise found that the plaintiff's tort claim alfeging intentional infliction of emotional distress
was an issue that should have been presented to a jury. Id at 182. Justice Levine, author of the
majority decision in Fern, argued in a special concurrence that gender discrimination in employment
in itself should be seen as conduct outrageous and tortious enough to raise a jury issue. Id at 187-89
(Levine, J., concurring specially).
148. 503 N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 1993).
149. Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225, 229 (N.D. 1993). Schuwigert dealt
with a gender discrimination claim brought by a woman who claimed she had been terminated based
on her gender. Id at 226. The trial court evaluated the discrimination in a manner inconsistent with
state law. Id at 229. Nonetheless, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the claim, finding that the decision was not clearly erroneous. Id at 230-31. In reaching
this decision, the court reviewed the framework it uses to analyze cases involving gender
discrimination. Id at 229. An employee who claims discrimination must first establish a prima facie
case. Id. Once this is done, a presumption of discrimination is established which the employer may
rebut by proving that its actions had a nondiscriminatory basis. Id. If a prima facie case of
discrimination is established, the burden of persuasion is on the employer, who must then convince
the fact finder that there was no discrimination. Id
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